Theory predicts that the wage e¤ects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers' and …rms' relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the e¤ect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers' individual wages in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for …rms below 15 employees and left …ring costs unchanged for bigger …rms. Accounting for the endogeneity of the treatment status, we …nd that high-bargaining power workers (stayers, white collar and workers above 45) are almost left una¤ected by the increase in EPL, while low-bargaining power workers (movers, blue collar and young workers) su¤er a drop both in the wage level and its growth rate.
Introduction
Since the work of Lazear (1990) , it has been well-known that in a perfectly competitive labour market the cost of employment protection legislation (EPL) is fully shifted onto lower wages if dismissal costs entail a transfer from …rms to risk neutral workers. Wages are also expected to fall if risk averse workers value job security and are willing to pay for an increase in EPL (Pissarides, 2001; Bertola, 2004) . Potentially o¤setting the negative e¤ect of EPL on wages, job security provisions may strengthen the bargaining position of workers vis-à-vis employers, allowing them to reap a larger share of the surplus and obtain higher wages in markets where individual or collective negotiation takes place (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Ljungqvist, 2002) . Moreover, stricter EPL may raise …rms'incentives to invest in training, thereby fostering the accumulation of …rm-speci…c human capital and increasing both productivity and wages (Autor et Thus, theory predicts an ambiguous impact of EPL on wages, with heterogenous e¤ects possibly stemming from di¤erences in the bargaining positions of workers vis-à-vis employers (Dolado et al., 2007) . This paper attempts to provide evidence for the e¤ects of EPL on workers' individual wages. The analysis is based on data from Italy, one of the strictest countries in terms of employment protection legislation. Italy is an interesting country to study for two additional reasons: First, although in Italy wage determination is to a large extent centralized, an important component of workers'compensation is determined at the …rm level in the form of company-level wage increments, production bonuses and other variable bene…ts (Guiso et al., 2005) . 1 Second, the changes in the Italian institutional framework allow us to achieve a clean identi…cation, exploiting EPL variation both across …rms and over time. In fact, until 1990 the Italian labour code, enacted in 1970, provided a sharp discontinuity in the application of EPL at the 15 employee threshold, with no protection for workers in small …rms and high protection for those in large …rms. In July 1990, severance payments were increased from zero to between 2.5 and 6 months of pay for …rms with fewer than 15 employees, and left unchanged for …rms with more than 15 employees.
We are therefore able to identify the e¤ects of employment protection legislation comparing wages of small versus large …rms workers before and after the law change in a neighbour-hood of the 15 employees threshold, thus combining a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with a di¤erence in di¤erence (DID) approach. Our identi…cation assumption is essentially that, after conditioning, the average wages of individuals employed in …rms marginally above the 15 employees threshold (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) represents a valid counterfactual for the wages of workers employed in …rms just below the threshold (5-15) both before and after the reform, i.e., we expect conditional wages in the treated and control groups to diverge after the law change for no other reason than the reform itself.
One natural concern, in our case, is the endogeneity of the treatment status. On the one side, it is possible that marginal …rms which kept their size just below 15 before the reform to avoid strict EPL rules, increased their size because of the reform. To control for …rms sorting into the large or small group according to time-invariant characteristics, we estimate …rm …xed e¤ects models. Additionally, we instrument the treatment status with …rm size in 1989 and 1988, when the reform was not in place and was unexpected. On the other side, workers may also sort around the 15 employees according to their preferences over the mix of employment protection and wages. To control for workers sorting into large or small …rms according to …xed characteristics, we estimate the model using worker …xed e¤ects.
This paper uses administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS),
and exploits a matched employer-employee panel which contains the entire population of workers and …rms located in the Italian provinces of Vicenza and Treviso. Baseline OLS estimates indicate a signi…cant wage loss in small relative to large …rms after the 1990 reform that ranges, on average, between 0.5 and 1 percent. The negative e¤ect is, however, highly heterogeneous. Movers su¤er a drop in the wage rate in small relative to large …rms after the reform of about 2 percent, while incumbent workers seem not to be harmed by stricter EPL.
Blue collar in small …rms experience a reduction of the wage rate after the reform of about 1.5 percent, whereas white collar are left una¤ected. Similarly, wages of workers below 45 in small …rms go down by 1 to 2 percent after the reform, while older workers su¤er no wage loss. The negative e¤ect is robust to the inclusion of worker …xed e¤ects, …rm …xed e¤ects and appears also when …rm size is instrumented, suggesting that the sorting of …rms may not be a big issue.
In order to investigate whether job security provisions a¤ect not only the level of the wage but also its growth rate, we look at the e¤ects of EPL on year-to-year log wage changes.
Results show that small …rms workers lose on average 1 percent in terms of wage growth after the reform relative to large …rms workers. The speci…cation in changes exhibits a similar pattern as the speci…cation in levels: even though all groups of workers (except white collar)
seem to be negatively a¤ected by the reform, the losses are quantitatively stronger among 3 movers, young workers and blue collar.
This pattern of results favours the interpretation that the ability of the employers to shift the cost of EPL onto wages depends on workers'bargaining power. Firms are better able to negotiate lower wages with new entrants rather than to renegotiate incumbents wages. At the same time, it is plausible to think that young and blue collar workers are in a weaker position within the …rm compared to older and white collar workers.
While there is a large literature on the e¤ects of EPL on job ‡ows, relative little empirical evidence is available on the wage e¤ects of dismissal costs. 2 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how …ring restrictions evolved in Italy. Section 3 describes the dataset and the sample selection rules. Section 4 explains the identi…cation strategy used to evaluate the impact of EPL on the wage dis-2 Previous empirical literature mostly concentrates on the e¤ects of EPL on employment ‡ows, often using the cross-state variation of EPL within the U.S.. Autor (2003) looks at the e¤ect of EPL on the use of temporary help agencies. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) consider re-employment probabilities. Some papers exploit the discontinuities in …ring costs regimes that apply to …rms of di¤erent sizes within countries. Boeri and Jimeno (2005) assess the e¤ect of EPL on lay-o¤ probabilities by comparing …rms below and above 15 employees in Italy, while Kugler and Pica (2006) examine the joint impact of EPL and product market regulation on job ‡ows in Italy using both the …rm size threshold and a law change. Using a di¤erence-indi¤erences approach, Bauer et al. (2007) investigate the impact of granting employees the right to claim unfair dismissal on employment in small German …rms. Also related is the literature on the e¤ects of changes in payroll tax rates on earnings (Gruber, 1997 and Matsaganis et al. 2010 ). 4 tribution. Section 5 presents OLS and IV estimates of the impact of increased strictness of employment protection in small …rms in Italy after 1990 on average wages. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes with a back of the envelope calculation of the share of EPL costs translated into lower wages.
Institutional background
The Italian labour code favours open-ended contracts over …xed-term or temporary contracts.
As a form of worker protection for open-ended contracts, labour codes specify which causes are considered justi…ed causes for dismissal, and establish workers'compensation depending on the reason for the termination. In contrast, temporary contracts can be terminated at no cost provided that the duration of the contract has expired. Labour codes also limit trial periods-that is, the period of time during which a …rm can test and dismiss a worker at no cost (in Italy 3 months) and mandate a minimum advance notice period prior to termination (1 month).
Over the years the Italian legislation ruling unfair dismissals has changed several times.
Both the magnitude of the …ring cost and the coverage of the …rms subject to the restrictions have gone through extensive changes. Individual dismissals were …rst regulated in Italy in 1966 through Law 604, which established that employers could freely dismiss workers either for economic reasons (considered as fair "objective"motives) or in case of misconduct (considered as fair "subjective"motives). However, in these cases workers could take employers to court and judges would determine if the dismissals were indeed fair or unfair. In case of unfair dismissal, employers had the choice to either reinstate the worker or pay severance, which depended on tenure and …rm size. Severance pay for unfair dismissals ranged between 5 and 8 months for workers with less than two and a half years of tenure, between 5 and 12 months for those between two and a half and 20 years of tenure, and between 5 and 14 months for workers with more than 20 years of tenure in …rms with more than 60 employees.
Firms with fewer than 60 employees had to pay half the severance paid by …rms with more than 60 employees, and …rms with fewer than 35 workers were completely exempt.
In 1970, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law 300) established that all …rms with more than 15 employees had to reinstate workers and pay their foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals.
Firms with fewer than 15 employees remained exempt. The law prescribes that the 15 employees threshold should refer to establishments rather than to …rms. In the data we only have information at the …rm level. However, this is not likely to be a concern as in the empirical analysis we focus on …rms between 5 and 25 employees that are plausibly single- Census. 4 Although limited to two relatively small provinces, the data are well suited for 3 A further reform was passed in 1991 concerning collective dismissals. A special procedure was introduced for …rms with more than 15 employees willing to dismiss …ve or more workers within 120 days because of plant closure or restructuring. According to this procedure, …rms were required to engage in negotiations with unions and government to reach an agreement on the dismissals. However, if public administration o¢ cials determine that an agreement cannot be reached, the …rm is free to downsize and the employees are not allowed to take the …rm to court. Kugler and Pica (2008) empirically distinguish the 1990 and the 1991 reforms and …nd no additional signi…cant e¤ect of the 1991 reform on workers and job ‡ows. Hence, this reform is unlikely to cloud our results. Paggiaro, Rettore and Trivellato (2008) also examine aspects of the 1991 law concerning active labour market policies and …nd limited e¤ects only on workers aged 50+. 4 The average establishment size in Veneto is 13 employees. Half of the employment stock is not subject to protection against dismissal as stated by art. 18 of the Statuto dei Lavoratori. For a decade Veneto has been studying the e¤ect of the 1990 EPL reform because the Italian north-east is characterized by a high concentration of small …rms and a tight labour market. Moreover, the availability of information on the universe of workers and …rms allows of building suitable instruments for …rm size and of applying IV techniques. 5 The use of a random sample of the Italian working population would only allow OLS estimates (available upon request).
The data include universal information on all plants and employees working at least one day in any plant of the two provinces from 1984 to 1997. The data include information on employees'age, gender, occupation (blue collar/white collar), yearly wage, number of paid weeks, type of contract (permanent/temporary), and information on …rms'location, sector of employment, average number of employees and date of closure. Unfortunately, we have no information on education. The unit of observation is the employer-day; such information is used to build a complete history of the working life of each employee. Once they are in the dataset, employees are followed, independently of their place of residence, even in their occupational spells out of Treviso and Vicenza.
The only reason of dropping out of the dataset is exit from the private sector or from employment status altogether. Since the individual longitudinal records are generated using social security numbers and collect information on private sector employees for the purpose of computing retirement bene…ts, employees are only followed through their employment spells.
The data stop following individuals who move into self-employment, the public sector, the agricultural sector, the underground economy, unemployment, or retirement.
We select all males of ages between 20 and 55 hired on a permanent basis. We exclude females because in their case the trade-o¤ between job security and wages is likely to be a¤ected by fertility decisions on which we have no information. We also exclude temporary workers because employment protection provisions are guaranteed only to workers on a permanent contract. 6 also a full employment region with a positive rate of job creation in manufacturing, compared to a negative national rate and positive migration ‡ows. Typical manufacturing activities are garments, mechanical goods, goldsmiths, leather, textile, furniture and plastics. The stock of manufacturing workers in the two Veneto provinces of Treviso and Vicenza has varied between 194,000 employees in the early 1980s and 233,000 employees in 1996, with a yearly positive average rate of variation of 1.4%. The average rate of growth in employment is the result of a marked increase in white collar and women (see Tattara and Valentini, 2005) . 5 Card et al. (2010) investigate the evidence on rent-sharing and holdup on the same data. 6 A further concern is that …rms can bypass the EPL regulation based on the 15 employees threshold hiring workers on a …xed term contract. The de…nition of the threshold is based on full-time equivalents rather than on heads and therefore leaves little room for …rms to circumvent the rule. In particular, the labour code excludes apprentices and temporary workers below nine months, and includes part-time workers and all other temporary contracts in proportion to their actual time. Our dataset records the type of contract (full-time, part-time, apprentices and temporary workers) but does not contain information on the number of hours worked. For this reason, in our estimates the threshold is calculated on the basis of full-time workers on permanent contracts.
We focus on 1989-1993 and remove 1990 because the reform occurred in the month of July and the wages of 1990 are likely to be a mixture of pre-reform and post-reform wages.
To preserve the comparability of treatment and control groups, we further select the sample to …rms within the interval 5-25 employees. In the course of the paper we use weekly wages after eliminating the upper and lower 1% of the wage distribution in each year. In case the same individual has multiple employment spells in di¤erent …rms in the same year we keep the longest spell. The …nal sample is of 9,914 …rms and 29,177 workers.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 1 .
The number of small …rms (5-15) is higher than the number of large …rms (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) , so is the number of workers working in small …rms, both before and after the reform. The real weekly wage of workers in large …rms is around 312 (331) euros per week before (after) the reform vs. a signi…cantly lower wage of 297 (312) euros per week in small …rms before (after) the reform. The year-to-year average wage change is however similar in the two groups in the range of 4-5% per year before the reform and 2.4-2.9% after the reform. The average age of workers is not signi…cantly di¤erent across the two groups while larger …rms employ a slightly higher proportion of white collar workers.
Identi…cation strategy
The estimand of interest is the average treatment e¤ect of EPL on wages. The conditional comparison of wages in small and big …rms does not generally provide an unbiassed estimate of the average treatment e¤ect, because …rms with di¤erent unobservable characteristics may endogenously choose their size and their wages. The fact that in Italy the level of EPL depends on …rm size, coupled with the reform of EPL which a¤ected only small …rms, can be exploited to build an RDD combined with a DID strategy to estimate the causal e¤ect of EPL on wages.
In order to identify the impact of dismissal costs on wages, we compare the change in mean wages paid by …rms just below 15 employees before and after the 1990 reform to the change in mean wages paid by …rms just above 15 employees. In other words, the assumption that guarantees that the e¤ect of EPL on wages can be interpreted as causal is that the characteristics of workers and …rms should not display any discontinuity at the threshold.
Another identi…cation assumption is that the average wage of individuals employed in …rms marginally below the 15 employees threshold (5-15) is expected to diverge from the wage of the control group employed in …rms just above the threshold (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) for no other reason than the law change.
If workers and …rms were exogenously assigned to the treatment and control groups, OLS estimates of the following model would identify the causal e¤ect of EPL on wages:
The dependent variable is the log of the weekly wage paid to worker i by …rm j in year t (or the …rst di¤erence of log wages in the speci…cation in changes, see Table 6 ) and is given by the yearly wage divided by the number of paid weeks.
The variable P ost is a dummy that takes the value of 1 starting from 1991 and zero
jt is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed in year t in a …rm with fewer than 15 employees and 0 if the worker is employed in a …rm with strictly more than 15 employees. The interaction term D S jt P ost between the small …rm dummy and the post-reform dummy is included to capture the e¤ect of the EPL reform. All speci…cations contain a polynomial of third degree in …rm size. 7 The matrix X ijt includes age dummies, an occupation (white collar/blue collar) dummy, nine industry dummies and year dummies which account for macro shocks and predate the main e¤ect of the post-reform dummy. The reported standard errors account for possible error correlations at the individual level.
Equation (1) gives unbiassed estimates only if workers and …rms are exogenously assigned to the treatment status. However, individuals may decide to work in small or large …rms, and …rms in turn may decide to grow above or shrink below the 15 employees threshold. Thus, a fundamental concern of this paper is the non-random selection of workers and …rms above and below the …fteen employees threshold. To control for the sorting of workers into large or small …rms according to time-invariant workers characteristics, we estimate the model using worker …xed e¤ects. In the same way, to control for the sorting of …rms into the large or small group, we estimate a model that includes …rm …xed e¤ects and, in an alternative speci…cation, we use an instrumental variable approach to which we now turn.
Firm sorting: the instrumental variable model
Identi…cation in (1) is threatened by the possibility that …rms sort around the 15 employees threshold. Regressions using …rm …xed e¤ects control for all time-invariant unobserved factors that may a¤ect the propensity of …rms to self-select into (or out of) treatment. However, they do not account for the selection due to the reform itself. Firms in the neighbourhood of the 15 employees'threshold may change their size in response to the 1990 reform of EPL, thus biassing the estimates. For example, …rms which kept their size just below 15 before the reform to avoid strict EPL rules, may have increased their size because the reform made the gap in EPL provisions narrower. The sign of the bias due to …rms'sorting is not easy to establish. If …rms which were keeping their size below 15 before the reform for fear of incurring a much higher EPL were those with bad growth perspectives and lower wages, then presumably OLS estimates understate the e¤ect of the reform on wages. But it may also be the case that the …rms which were keeping under the threshold were instead those which were paying higher wages.
In this section, we assess the validity of the identi…cation strategy discussed in Section 4 with two di¤erent testing procedures. First, to formally check for the absence of manipulation of the running variable at 15 (violated if …rms were able to alter their size and sort above or below the threshold), we test the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of …rm size at 15 as proposed by McCrary (2008) . Second, we regress the probability of …rm growth on pre-existing …rm characteristics.
In Figure 1 , we plot the frequency of …rms with less than 25 employees, using di¤erent bin sizes (0.5 and 1) for 1989 (before the reform) and for 1991 (after the reform). Visual inspection does not reveal any clear discontinuity at the 15 employees threshold. 8 In the right panel of the same …gure, we zoom in on the shape of the running variable around the 15 employees threshold. There, no evidence of manipulative sorting can be detected. We formally test for the presence of a density discontinuity at this threshold with a McCrary test by running kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of the threshold (McCrary, 2008). As we can see from the …gure, the log-di¤erence between the frequency to the right and to the left of the threshold is not statistically signi…cant. In fact, the point estimate is -0.007 (with a standard error of 0.236). However, density tests have low power if manipulation has occurred on both sides of the threshold. In that case, there might be non-random sorting not detectable in the distribution of the running variable. …xed e¤ects. We then use the time-invariant portion of the residual as one of the determinants of the …rm probability of growing. The probit regression is of the form
where d jt = 1 if …rm j in year t has a larger size than in t 1: The term dummyS jt 1 denotes a set of …rm size dummies while the variable P ost takes the value of one from 1991. The term F E j denotes the estimated …rm …xed e¤ects. The matrix X jt includes a quadratic in …rms'age, year dummies, sector dummies and a polynomial in lagged …rm size.
Column 1 of Table 2 While the fact that there is little evidence of …rm sorting is reassuring, we also show results adopting an IV strategy to address the further concern that residual unobserved heterogeneity may drive …rms'sorting behaviour. As an instrument for the treatment status (the …rm size dummy), we use …rm size in 1989 and in 1988. These instruments are not a¤ected by the reform as long as the reform was unexpected (see Section 2). The formal speci…cation is
where S 
Worker sorting
Identi…cation in (1) may be threatened also by workers non-randomly sorting around the 15 employees threshold. The idea is that workers (particularly job-to-job movers) may be able to choose their own EPL regime by selecting the size of the …rm they work for. This may bias our results as long this selection process is driven by worker characteristics that we are not able to control for. Suppose, for example, that low-productivity workers disproportionately apply to (and are subsequently hired in) more protected jobs. In this case, a negative association between wages and job protection cannot be interpreted as the causal e¤ect of EPL on wages, as it rather re ‡ects the di¤erent composition of the pool of workers in protected and non protected jobs.
Including worker …xed e¤ects into (1) helps address this concern to the extent that it allows of controlling for all time-invariant unobservable worker attributes that a¤ect the choice of the workers regarding their EPL regime. Of course, worker …xed e¤ects do not allow of controlling for the time-varying factors that a¤ect worker self-selection, including the reform itself.
It is therefore desirable to test whether workers non-randomly sort into …rms above and below the 15 employees threshold. We do so adopting two strategies. First, we check whether …rms observable characteristics, such as industry, age, and occupation (white collar/blue collar) composition of the workforce, are balanced in the neighbourhood of the 15 employees threshold. If non-random workers sorting were to occur, we would expect these characteristics to di¤er systematically between treated and untreated …rms around the 15 employees threshold. The balance tests are performed running the …rm-level regression:
Notice that this test gives also insights on whether other (unobserved) policies di¤erentially a¤ect small and large …rms since 1990. Indeed, our empirical strategy may be hampered by the presence of unobserved factors (for example another policy change) that are also discontinuous at the threshold exactly at the time of the reform, thus confounding the e¤ect of the reform itself. Although we cannot directly test this assumption, we can investigate whether …rms observable characteristics have discontinuities at the threshold after 1990. Table 3 shows the coe¢ cients and standard errors of 2 : No pre-treatment characteristics show a signi…cant discontinuity at the 15 employees threshold after the reform in the 3nd degree polynomial speci…cation. In particular, the age, occupation, and industry composition of …rms across the two sides of the threshold is not signi…cantly di¤erent after the reform.
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The only weakly signi…cant coe¢ cients belong to three industry dummies in the case of the 2rd degree polynomial speci…cation. These results are also suggestive that the e¤ect of the change in EPL is unlikely to be confounded with the e¤ect of another policy that depends on …rm size and shares the same threshold.
We further test for non-random selection of workers by explicitly looking at their ‡ows across …rms. If the reform lowers the wage in small …rms relative to big …rms after the reform, one may expect larger ‡ows of workers from small to big …rms and smaller ‡ows from big to small …rms after the reform. In order to assess the extent of worker sorting we run regressions of the probability of workers moving to a big …rm or to a small …rm on a number of determinants that include a small …rm dummy interacted with year dummies.
The probit regression is of the form:
where d ij 0 t equals 1 if in year t worker i moves from …rm j to a …rm j 0 with more than 15 employees (Table 4 , columns 1 and 2) or to a …rm j 0 with fewer than 15 employees (Table   4, Table 4 show that there is a lower probability of moving to …rms larger Table 4 shows that the drop in the probability of moving from a small to a large …rm is smaller for high-wage workers in 1991 (positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on
while it is independent of (the time-invariant component of) workers wages in 1990 and 1992 Tables 3 and 4 suggest that non-random sorting of workers around the 15 employees threshold should not be a major issue, for robustness purposes the next section 14 will show results from workers'…xed e¤ects regressions that control for any time-invariant worker attributes that may a¤ect their behaviour.
Even though

Results
Theory delivers ambiguous predictions on the wage e¤ects of EPL as workers are subject to two o¤setting forces: on the one hand according to the Coasean-Lazear model we should expect EPL to lower wages as …rms try and translate part of their cost increase onto workers.
On the other hand insider-outsider theories suggest that EPL strengthens workers'bargaining position and possibly leads to an increase in wages. This is why in what follows we cut our sample into high-(stayers, white collar, old) and low-bargaining power subsamples (movers, blue collar, young).
Before turning to the estimates, let us provide a visual summary of the relationship between EPL and wages. Figure 2 draws a scatter plot of the di¤erence between post-reform and pre-reform log wages against …rm size in 1989. Each point is the average log wage di¤erence within …rms of the same size. 9 The …gure also reports the …tted values of a third degree polynomial regression of the average log wage di¤erences with respect to …rm size in 1989. As …rm size is taken to be that of 1989 to minimize endogeneity issues, the picture can be thought of as representing the reduced form of the IV speci…cation. The …gure shows a positive jump in the di¤erence between post-and pre-reform log wages at the 15 employees threshold, meaning that in the neighbourhood of the threshold wages in small …rms decrease after 1990 relative to wages in large …rms. This is consistent with the interpretation that small …rms translate part of the increased cost of EPL into lower wages. The general patterns presented in the …gure are also borne out in the regression results to which we now turn. OLS results for the full sample (Column 1, Panel A) suggest that workers in …rms just below the …rm size threshold of 15 employees are paid 1.1 percent less than workers in …rms immediately above the cuto¤ after 1990. Columns 2 and 3 refer to worker and …rm …xed e¤ects estimates, respectively, and show that the negative OLS result is robust (albeit lower in magnitude) to the inclusion of worker …xed e¤ects but does not survive the inclusion of …rm-speci…c dummies. This may be due to the heterogeneity of the e¤ects across di¤erent workers within the same …rm, as the within-…rm variation (that identi…es the …rm …xed e¤ects coe¢ cients) derives from the aggregation of potentially highly heterogeneous and o¤-setting worker e¤ects. Finally, columns 4 and 5 refer to IV and IV with worker …xed e¤ects estimates, respectively. Both speci…cations deliver negative and signi…cant coe¢ cients of approximately the same magnitude as the OLS results. 10 This is reassuring as it con…rms the impression that …rm sorting is not a major source of bias.
Panels B and C of Table 5 Of course, the strength of bargaining power does not refer necessarily to unionization rates (which are very low among small …rms workers in Veneto, as in the whole country, while coverage is very high) but to the option value of workers in the market.
Finally, we look at e¤ects of the EPL reform on log wage changes to investigate whether stricter EPL a¤ects wage growth on top of levels. Results in Table 6 show that indeed this is the case. Full sample estimates in Panel A show that workers lose on average 1% in terms of wage growth after the reform in small …rms relative to large …rms. The e¤ect is negative and signi…cant in all speci…cations (worker …xed e¤ects, …rm …xed e¤ects and IVs). It is worth noticing that the fact that the speci…cation in changes yields a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient even including …rm …xed e¤ects (and the coe¢ cient of interest is identi…ed by within …rm variation) seems to indicate that the negative e¤ects on wage growth are more evenly spread across di¤erent workers types, contrary to the case of wage levels.
This impression is con…rmed in the analysis of the di¤erent subsamples. Both movers (Panel B) and stayers (Panel C) in small …rms su¤er signi…cant wage losses after the reform relative to large …rms workers. While the negative e¤ect on movers is larger in magnitude, the fact that also stayers are hit by the reform suggests that they also pay part of the increase in EPL in the form of lower wage growth (or, given that these workers stay in the same …rm, 
Contractual minimum wages and quantile regression
Similarly to many other European countries, Italy has a system of sectoral minimum wages bargained at the national level (every 2 years, with exceptions) which extends also to nonsignatory workers. In this section we exploit information on the sectoral minimum wage to construct a measure of the "wage drift", i.e. the di¤erence between the actual wage and the sectoral minimum. Thus, the wage drift is y ijt = w ijt w min jt .where w min jt is the contractual minimum in sector j. 11 The average wage premium is 247 Euros per week or in percentage terms the average premium is 40%. The average wage drift di¤ers by sector and goes from 29% in the insurance sector to 45% of employees of law …rms. 12 The wage drift can be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power of the workers: the higher is the actual compensation with respect to the contractual minimum the higher is the bargaining power of the workers (Card et al., 2010) . Following this reasoningand consistently with the previous results -we should expect larger wage cuts for lowbargaining power workers with small wage premia over the minimum. Of course, wages at (or very close to) the minimum should be insensitive to changes in EPL because of the binding legal ‡oor. To investigate these hypotheses we run a quantile regression at di¤erent points of the distribution using as a dependent variable the log of the wage drift log y ijt = log(w ijt w min jt ). Let Q (log y ijt jX ijt ) for 2 (0; 1) denote the th quantile of the distribution of log y ijt conditional on individual and …rm characteristics included in the matrix X ijt (same controls as in equation (1)). The model of the conditional quantile is:
Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained from individual resampling. Table 7 reports the estimates of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term 2 obtained at the 5th, 10th, 50th and 90th quantile. Results show that the negative e¤ect of the reform on the wages of small …rm workers is stronger at the bottom of the wage drift distribution and weaker at the top. Panel A shows results for the full sample of workers for whom we have information on the contract in the benchmark period 1989-1993. While the coe¢ cient of interest is negative and signi…cant at all percentiles, the e¤ect at the 5th percentile of the wage drift distribution is more than four times larger than the e¤ect at the top of the distribution (and than the average e¤ect obtained in Table 5 on all workers). Panel B on blue collar workers con…rms this pattern.
These results are in accordance with the interpretation that …rms were able to translate the increased EPL costs onto workers with low bargaining power. The fact that we …nd a strong e¤ect also on wages very close to the minimum (the 5th percentile of the wage drift) is explained by the fact that even at the 5th percentile there is still a 31% premium on average, 12 Collective contracts do not correspond exactly to sectors but vary according to …rm size and type of …rm. We have information on 27 types of contracts: employees of manufacturing …rms, small and medium size manufacturing …rms, artisan …rms in the manufacturing sector, food manufacturing, insurance …rms, shoemaking …rms, paper products, retail industry, employees of cooperative …rms in the retail industry, leather products, construction …rms, small construction …rms, cooperative construction …rms, construction artisans, toys and personal products, wooden products, artisan wooden products, equipment instalment …rms, equipment instalment state-owned …rms, equipment instalment small …rms, equipment instalment artisan …rms, metal products small …rms, cleaning services, cleaning services small …rms, transport …rms, professional …rms, textiles products, tourism. or 140 euro per week over the minimum, i.e. wage minima are hardly binding in this sample.
Robustness checks and placebo tests
This section shows that our results are robust to a number of checks. In Table 8 we implement placebo tests by estimating the treatment e¤ect at fake thresholds, where there should be no e¤ect. In particular, we look at …rms below and above the fake 10 employees threshold and we estimate the treatment e¤ect before and after 1993 and before and after 1988. The results are reassuring in that the coe¢ cients of the treated group are always insigni…cant.
In Table 9 we run robustness checks with respect to the time span of the sampleenlarging the sample from the benchmark 1989-1993 to 1988-1993, 1987-1994 and 1986-1996 -and with respect to the window of …rm size-from the benchmark 5-25 to 5-20, 10-20 and 10-25. Both panels show that our results are robust to changes in the sample.
In Table 10 we also show that the results are robust to a di¤erent speci…cation. To test the robustness of the estimates to the polynomial speci…cation we also …t a linear regression function to the observations distributed within a distance on both sides of the threshold:
where X ijt contains the same controls as in equation (1). We choose with the crossvalidation method of Imbens and Lemieux (2008) . The cross-validation method consists in choosing so as to minimize the loss function:
where, for every f size j to the left (right) of the threshold 15, we predict [ log w (f size j ) as if it were at the boundary of the estimation using only observations in the interval f size j 2 [15 ; 15 + ]. We choose the optimal between 1 and 15. The optimal = 10 with L(10) = 0:03762235. Table 10 shows that the results are robust to the speci…cation change: the local linear regression estimator yields a negative signi…cant coe¢ cient for OLS and weaker but still negative signi…cant results for workers'and …rms'…xed e¤ects and IVs.
Panel B of Table 10 tests successfully the results with samples taken over di¤erent years.
Conclusion
This paper examined the e¤ect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on wages, a largely underexplored issue in the wide literature on EPL. It exploited, as a natural experiment, a reform of EPL in Italy which increased severance payments after 1990 for …rms with fewer than 15 employees relative to larger …rms.
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We …nd that average wages of male workers declined by around 0.7%-1.5% in …rms below 15 employees, relative to larger …rms, because of the 1990 EPL reform. Our result are consistent with an explanation based on bargaining power because the e¤ect is concentrated on new hires (rather than stayers), on blue collar and on young workers, all groups with a relatively low bargaining power. Stayers su¤ered a moderate reduction of wage growth after the reform. We showed that our results are robust to many changes in the sample time span and in the window of …rm size considered around the 15 employees threshold. Placebo tests con…rmed that the results apply only in 1990 for …rms at the 15 employees threshold and not in other cases.
It is important to stress that our empirical exercise-which is local in nature as any RDD-cannot help determining whether any increase in EPL would be o¤set by lower wages.
However, the Italian case o¤ers not only a clean natural experiment which involved a vast quantity of …rms and workers, but may also provide insights on the e¤ects of EPL in the many countries which have …rm-level thresholds in the application of EPL.
Using our estimates, it is possible to calculate how much of the increase in the …ring cost is translated onto lower wages. 13 We start by considering the situation of a employerinitiated dismissal of a worker of average tenure in a small …rm after the reform. If the dismissal is ruled unfair by the judge, the …ring cost will range between 2.5 and 6 months (on average 16 weeks) of the last wage. On the basis of our data, the post-reform average weekly wage amounts to approximately 313 euros. Therefore, the severance pay transferred to the worker amounts to 313 16 weeks = 5,008 euros, excluding the legal expenses that can be roughly calculated to be as much as 5,000 euros. The above computation results in a very high …ring cost, but we should keep in mind that this is the worst possible scenario for the …rm. Ex-ante, the …rm does not know with certainty whether the separation will be ruled unfair by the court. Furthermore, …rms and workers may …nd a settlement out of court. Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2000), using data based on actual court sentences, estimate that in Italy the probability of reaching an out-of-court agreement to be around 0:5 and the probability that the dismissal is ruled unfair to be about 0:5. If we assume that in case of an out-of-court agreement the employer pays approximately the same sum that would be paid in the form of severance pay, …rms below 15 employees can expect a …ring cost equal to 5,008 0:5 = 2,504 euros excluding legal expenses. If we assume a probability of 10% of the occurrence of individual …ring for economic reasons, the total expected cost ex-ante is (5,000 + 2,504)=10 = 750:4 euros.
Heckman and Pagès (2004) develop a measure of the expected present discounted cost to the …rm, at the time a worker is hired, associated with severance payments to that worker in the future (they also take into account notice period, which is not of interest here). Adopting an analogous approach, one could use the estimates in the paper to compute the e¤ect of severance payments on the expected present discounted value of wages, also at the time the worker is hired. On the basis of our estimates in Table 5 We use an annual discount rate of 8%, i.e., a discount factor of = 0:92. To match an average tenure of 3.5 years, we use an annual survival probability of = 0:71. Let W be the present discounted value of the wage loss due to the reform W ( b 2 j ; ) = 179
516:1. This implies that around 68:8% (516=750 = 0:688) of the expected …ring cost is translated into lower wages. Notice that a 68.8% o¤setting e¤ect is not inconsistent with the view that severance payments may actually strengthen the bargaining power of (incumbent)
workers: in fact the average hides heterogenous e¤ects across di¤erent workers. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if in firm j employment at time t is larger than employment at time t-1, and 0 otherwise. Firms between 5 and 25 workers are included. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in lagged firm size, a quadratic in firms' age, sector dummies and year dummies. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%. In the first (last) two columns the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if worker i moves to a firm with more (less) than 15 employees and 0 otherwise. Firms between 5 and 25 employees included. All specifications include a quadratic in workers' age, year dummies, sector dummies and a polynomial in the size of the firm of origin. Standard errors in brackets. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denote significance at 1%. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy (except in panels D and E). One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy (except in panels D and E). One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%. The wage drift is the difference between the actual wage and the sectoral minimum wage. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%. All specifications include workers fixed effects, a third degree polynomial in the size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the firm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%. The optimal symmetric bandwidth is chosen with cross-validation methods ∆=10. All specifications include age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. One asterisk denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks denote significance at 5%; three asterisks denotes significance at 1%.
